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SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE - DEPENDENT
CHILDREN - STEPFATHER'S OBLIGATION
Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.),
aff'd mem., 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
Benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program (AFDC)1 can no longer be characterized as a mere gra-
tuity from the government. Informal, charitable notions of gift
baskets for the needy, popular in earlier years, have given way to a
complex, bureaucratic system of cooperative federalism, which pro-
hibits arbitrary impairment by the states of a recipient's right to re-
ceive AFDC benefits.2 In determining both the eligibility for and
the amount of AFDC payments, the states must comply with the
Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). 3
Moreover, the state's program must not offend the spirit of the Act
to insure extensive home care for needy children. Implementation
of the AFDC program was initially hindered by the discretionary
latitude enjoyed by the states. Especially troublesome were state
legislative schemes designed to reduce benefits flowing to other-
wise eligible classes of recipients.4 Sensitive to past abuses, a fed-
eral district court in the recent case of Solman v. Shapiro,5 has de-
limited state power to determine eligibility requirements for AFDC
benefits. The impact of the decision, however, may effectively alter
state administration of the AFDC program in such a manner as to
produce deleterious effects from the standpoint of federal welfare
goals.
The plaintiffs in Solman had once been the sole supervisory rel-
atives of their needy children and had qualified as beneficiaries
under Connecticut's AFDC program. After their remarriage, how-
1 Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 To the extent that a recipient is eligible for a specified payment, it is arguable that
the AFDC program creates a vested right in such benefits which the states cannot abro-
gate sua sponte. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE UJ. 1245-46 (1965). See also Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and
Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L REV. 210, 224-42 (1967).
3 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969); 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969).
For the text of this regulation, see note 9 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 17-21 infra.
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ever, Connecticut threatened to curtail, either wholly or in part, the
plaintiffs' benefits on the ground that the needy children now had
a stepfather living in the home. Plaintiffs challenged the validity
of the state's action and sought injunctive relief from a three-judge
federal court.6 Specifically, they challenged Connecticut's statute
and interpretive regulation7 which provided that in determining
the need of an AFDC recipient having a stepfather who was both
employed and living in the house, the income of the stepfather
would be deemed available for the support of the recipient whether
or not the stepfather actually expended money on the recipient.8
In granting injunctive relief, the unanimous three-judge court
held, without reaching constitutional questions, that Connecticut's
statute contravened the pertinent federal regulation which provided
that the income of the stepparent, who had no legal obligation of
support, could not be deemed available for the support of the step-
child.9
6 A three-judge federal court may be convened where plaintiff asserts constitutional
claims which are not insubstantial, coupled with claims based on conflicting state and
federal laws, and, as here, where injunctive relief is sought to restrain state officials from
the execution of a state statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. See Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago RI. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
7 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-87 (a) (1958) provided that in determining need
of AFDC recipients:
[Tlhe ability of a stepparent to provide for the support of his minor step-
child or stepchildren residing with him shall be considered in the same manner
as that of a natural parent is considered, and a stepparent is defined for pur-
poses of this section as one who marries the parent of a minor child or children
of whom such stepparent is not the actual parent ....
This statute was implemented by a regulation providing that when an employed step-
parent is living in the home eligibility for AFDC benefits exists only if his income and
all income from other sources is insufficient to meet the family's total need. 1 CONN.
STATE WELFARE MANUAL § 345.3, cited in 300 F. Supp. at 412. This regulation very
carefully circumscribed the purview of the state's consideration of a stepfather's income.
8 Plaintiffs contended that Connecticut's curtailment of AFDC benefits was contrary
to the Social Security Act and the HEW regulations promulgated thereunder. Because
a stepfather is not obligated by Connecticut statutes to support his stepchildren, plaintiffs
contended further that the state's implementation of the AFDC program was in viola-
tion of the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th amendment. 300 F.
Supp. at 412.
9 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969) provides:
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children ... must
provide that the determination whether a child has been deprived of parental
support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such
cases) the unemployment of his father, will be made only in relation to the
child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to a child's stepparent who is
ceremonially mnarried to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally
obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which
requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural or
adoptive parents are required to support their children.
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An understanding of whether the Connecticut welfare regula-
tion 0 represented a proscribed departure from the HEW regulation
delimiting state administrative discretion with respect to allocating
AFDC payments requires an examination of the conceptual develop-
ment of the welfare system. In the period before Congress enacted
the present AFDC program, the states believed that they could im-
pose their own standards of morality upon welfare recipients be-
cause welfare was generally characterized as a gift of government
funds.:" Initially, then, a mere handful of the poor participated in
these limited programs of state financial aid. In this early period,
the state-funded programs emphasized the value of a good home
life for the child, and all efforts were directed toward insuring a
"suitable home" by requiring mothers to demonstrate that they were
proper and competent custodians of their children."2 Following the
(b) The inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a "substitute
parent" or "man-in-the-house" or any individual other than one described in
paragraph (a) of this section is not an acceptable basis for a finding of in-
eligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State .... 111n
the consideration of all income and resources in establishing financial eligibil-
ity and the amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is ac-
tually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the
income only of the parent described in paragraph (a) of this section will be
considered available for children in the household in absence of proof of actual
contributions. (emphasis added).
10 1 CONN. STATE WELFARE MANuAL § 345.3, cited in 300 F. Supp. at 412.
"1 See Reich, supra note 2, at 1245.
12 This concept of the "worthy poor" is interesting for the light it sheds upon later
state attempts to curtail AFDC benefits to those who, in some way, demonstrated their
"unworthy" character. There was a distinct preference for the "worthy poor," and the
concept pervaded the precursors of the AFDC program.
In the early part of this century, because of their supposed incapacity for "moral
regeneration," the great majority of poor people were excluded from the various pension
and welfare programs such as so-called "mother's pension programs," where only
mothers beyond moral reproach were selected for handouts. This selection process was
accomplished through a careful screening of each mother. Resultantly, a majority of
the needy mothers and their children were excluded from "pension" benefits.
The mother's pension programs operated under two principles: (1) Only a small
class of indigents was selected for special public treatment; (2) the state's financial sup-
port of the mother was designed to enable her to maintain a "suitable home," but only
if the mother could demonstrate her worth as a proper custodian of her children. The
purpose of this program was to insure that a small group of children would remain in
their own homes to develop, through supervision and education, into decent citizens who
would become assets to society. W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 5 (1965);
see J. BROWN, PUBLIc RELIEF 1929-1939, at 26-32 (1940); H. LEYENDECKER, PROB-
LEMS AND POLICY IN PUBLic ASSISrANcE 46 (1955); Reich, supra note 2, at 1245.
It is, perhaps, helpful from a historical viewpoint to note that during the pre-1935
heyday of the mother's pension programs the idea that poverty could be eliminated was
nonexistent Thus, the "suitable home" provisions in state welfare programs "were
ideally suited to provide the assurance taxpayers may have needed that only 'worthy'
families, reflecting the highest of publicly held values, reaped rewards." W. BELL,
supra at 19. For states such as Alabama, the "worthy poor" notion dovetailed with the
traditionally Victorian southern mores and, not surprisingly, was carried over into the
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passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the states enjoyed some
financial relief, but they also acquired in the federal government
a new partner with a different view of welfare.
From its inception, the AFDC program envisioned a system
based on need rather than worthiness. The goal of AFDC was to
enable the states to provide home care for all needy children through
a comprehensive plan of cooperation with the federal government.' 3
However, the state plan was required to meet certain federal guide-
lines designed to prevent arbitrary administrative measures before a
state could receive financial help from the federal government. 4
By placing primary emphasis on the needs of the child rather than
on arbitrary standards such as the morality of the child's mother,
this program represented a significant departure from the prior con-
cept of welfare. Notwithstanding an exclusive need standard dearly
delineated by Congress,'" many states continued to chart a course
systematically designed to curtail benefits to the "unworthy" poor.
Two basic ploys were utilized to effectively discriminate against
classes of welfare recipients. First, any recipient found living in an
unsanitary home or under immoral conditions could have his AFDC
payments curtailed until such time as the home conditions met the
state-imposed standards. 6 Although the federal government out-
lawed "suitable home" provisions in 1960,17 an almost indistinguish-
able doctrine evolved. This doctrine, the odious "substitute father"
provision, gave the welfare agencies the power to curtail aid pay-
administrative policy of the state's AFDC program. This provided a handy mechanism
by which the states could justify to the federal government their denial of aid to certain
needy families. See note 19 infra & accompanying text.
13 Social Security Act § 401, ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
14The minimum qualifications for a state plan are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). Some of the qualifica-
tions are: (1) A state plan must be mandatory on all of its political subdivisions; (2)
it must provide for financial participation by the state; (3) it should provide for a single
administrative state agency; and (4) the plan should set out procedures for a fair admin-
istrative hearing of recipients' asserted claims of state action to wrongfully deny AFDC
benefits. Id.
15Social Security Act §§ 401-06, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (Supp. IV, 1969).
1 6 This requirement was a thinly veiled carryover of the suitable home concept which
had pervaded the earlier mother's pension programs. See note 12 supra & accompany-
ing text. See generally W. BELL, snpra note 12, at 93-123; Comment, Non-Need Re-
lated Provisions for the Receipt of AFDC, 9 J. FAMILY L. 101, 106 (1969).
17 This became known as the "Fleming Rule." In 1960, after it was shown that
Louisiana had denied aid to over 20,000 children, the then Secretary of HEW, Arthur
Fleming, issued a ruling disallowing state denial of AFDC aid based on "suitable home"
provisions. W. BELL, supra note 12, at 147.
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ments whenever evidence indicated that a recipient's mother was
having an illicit affair with a male.'
Two factors allowed those states adopting the doctrine to con-
tinue to circumvent the policy delineated in the Social Security Act.
First, the statutory scheme embodying the AFDC program lacked
adequate federal guidelines for controlling state administration of
the benefits. Ironically, this dearth of standards resulted from the
wide discretion that Congress had purposely incorporated into the
Act in the belief that state-federal cooperation would be enhanced.' 9
The second factor that enabled the states to continue discrimina-
tory practices was the practical difficulty encountered by welfare
recipients in their efforts to finance legal action against the of-
fending states.
2 0
The broad spectrum of the state's regulatory domain was abruptly
'8 This male was not a stepfather as in the instant case, but rather some phantom
creature who darted in and out during the night to make love with his mistress. Al-
though there is an argument to be made that the state had a valid interest in upholding
the moral standards of the community, the unvarnished effect of a state regulation which
assumed a paternal obligation based on infrequent cohabitation was to discriminate
against a certain class of needy children. This male would not even meet a common
sense definition of a "parent," yet a finding of his presence in the house effectively cur-
tailed AFDC payments to the needy children of his supposed mistress. In one case, for
example, a grant was discontinued because investigators "believed a shirt they found did
not belong to the mother's son, as both she and the boy contended, but rather to a man."
W. BELL, supra note 12, at 90.
It is interesting to note that a mother in California is, even today, in danger of crim-
inal prosecution for grand theft if she falls to inform the welfare agency that she is
living with a man who is capable of helping her financially. See People v. Shirley, 55
Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1961) (mother convicted of grand theft
of county welfare funds where she failed to report a man was living with her who con-
tributed money for her support).
The "substitute father" statutes were finally declared illegal in the landmark decision
of King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), where the Court observed that there were other
ways in which states could regulate community moral standards so that needy children
would not suffer in the process. The Court pointed out that "Congress has made at
least this one determination: that destitute children who are legally fatherless cannot be
flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a
substitute father." 392 U.S. at 334.
19 In King v. Smith, Mr. Chief Justice Warren noted that "there is no question that
States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is
free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount
of funds it devotes to the program." 392 U.S. at 318. See Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F.
Supp. 1109 (S.D. Me. 1969). For limitations on the present scope of state discretion,
see note 39 infra & text accompanying note 38.
20 The unavailability of a federal forum was particularly acute prior to the liberaliza-
tion of class action requirements by the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See 37 F.R.D. 71, 79 (1965). Unchallenged by welfare recipients, state
welfare agencies wielded so much unbridled discretion that, as one commentator ob-
served, the agencies virtually made "the law by administrative interpretations under the
pressure of current public opinion - interpretations that [were] neither consistent from
one jurisdiction to another nor in accord with the original purposes of the legislature."
Reich, supra note 2, at 1252.
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limited by the landmark case of King v. Smith,2 wherein Alabama's
substitute father regulation was held violative of the Social Security
Act.22 The Alabama regulation presumptively considered the in-
come of the substitute father available to the children of his mis-
tress."3 The state could thereby deny AFDC benefits to the children
of any mother who cohabited with an able-bodied male who was
not her husband. Alabama's administrative plan rested upon no-
tions of morality regarding the mother's conduct rather than the
congressional standard of need. 4 Alabama justified this result
through its interpretation of the federal regulation defining a "de-
pendent child" as "a needy child ... who has been deprived of pa-
rental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent." 2 Ala-
bama sought to bring its definition of a substitute father within the
literal meaning of a non-absent "parent" as set forth in the Act.
Under this strained definition, the child had not been deprived of
parental support because the mother's paramour was a "parent" who
was deemed present in the home. In this way the state effectively
denied aid to children who were otherwise eligible.
In rejecting this logic, the Supreme Court pointed out that
Alabama was, in effect, positing eligibility on whether the substi-
tute father had sexual relations with the mother, rather than on a
finding of whether this paramour was legally obligated to support
the child or actually did contribute to his support. The Court rea-
21392 U.S. 309 (1968).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (Supp. IV, 1969). At the time of the King decision, HEW-
approved "substitute father" policies were also in effect in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Additional "man-in-the-house" policies existed
in the District of Columbia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Kargman, Acquiring New Relations by Statutory Regulation: Reflections on King v.
Smith, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 378 (1968). See Comment, supra note 17; 20 MERcER L. REV.
325 (1969); 47 TEXAS L.R BV. 349 (1969).
23 Further, under the Alabama regulation any able-bodied man was considered to be
the father of the applicant's children if he lived in the applicant's home for the purpose
of cohabitation with her, or even if he infrequently visited the home for this purpose.
ALA. MANUAL FOR ADMIN. OF PUB. AsSIsTANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI (V) (A), cited in
392 U.S. at 313-14.
24 In King, the Supreme Court made it very clear that the sole congressional standard
was need:
The appellees ... meet Alabama's need requirements; their alleged substitute
father makes no contribution to their support; and they have been denied as-
sistance solely on the basis of the substitute father regulation. Further, the
regulation itself is unrelated to need, because the actual financial situation of
the family is irrelevant in determining the existence of a substitute father.
392 U.S. at 320.
2542 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
PUBLIC WELFARE
soned that "Congress must have meant by the term 'parent' an in-
dividual who owed to the child a state-imposed legal duty of sup-
port."26 The majority decried a system whereby "children . . . are
told, as Alabama has told these appellees, to look for their food to
a man who is not in the least obligated to support them."' 7  The
Court's mandate was dear: No asserted interest of the state to up-
hold community moral standards could excuse the state from the
diligent observance of the premise that all welfare programs should
be based on the need of the recipient. For the first time an indi-
gent welfare group had precipitated the overthrow of a significant
state-devised discriminatory scheme.28 In the wake of King v.
Smith, the HEW promulgated a regulation reflective of the federal
need standard enunciated by the Supreme Court.29
The Solman case is set against this -developmental milieu.
Since Connecticut did not have a law of general applicability im-
posing a legal obligation on a stepfather to support his stepchildren,"0
the state relied on section 240(h) of the Social Security Act which,
on its face, allows the states in determining the level of a recipient's
benefits to take into account the income of "any other individual"
living in the home8' as well as the income of the AFDC recipient.
By urging the court to adopt a literal interpretation of the words
"any other individual," Connecticut sought to demonstrate statutory
authority for distinguishing the King decision on the ground that
Connecticut had considered the stepfather's income only to compute
the aggregate family AFDC payment and not to render the step-
26 392 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 30.
2 8 Before the King decision, federal "negotiators" had the burden of correcting any
discrimination by the states in their management of the AFDC program. Although the
abuses of the states were noted and documented by these investigators, little was ac-
complished toward, correcting these abuses because the federal government had failed
to adequately limit the states' administrative discretion. Because these states controlled
the direction of the program, they were consistently able to devise evasive tactics which
managed to neutralize to some extent public criticism - which in turn forestalled a
court challenge. Ultimately, it became obvious that the states' policies were effectively
denying aid to truly needy children. See W. BELL, supra note 12, at 189.
2945 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969).
3 0 300 F. Supp. at 414.
3142 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969) provides that the state welfare agency:
IS]hall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and
resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent chil-
dren, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such child and
relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determin-
ing the need of the child or relative claiming such aid .... (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the HEW regulation interpreting this subsection and the relevance
thereof to Solman, see note 36 infra & accompanying text.
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children ineligible for AFDC benefits.32 Connecticut, in essence,
was not trying to avoid King so much as it was trying to emphasize
what it believed were legal and factual distinctions between the
Alabama "substitute father" provision and the Connecticut step-
father regulation.
After an examination of Connecticut's reasoning, the district
court concluded that the state had misread the Act when it char-
acterized "other individual" to mean an individual whose income
may be considered within the total family need for the purpose of
decreasing that family's benefits under the AFDC program. Con-
ceding that the statutory language standing alone ostensibly allows
a state, in determining need, to consider the income of any other
person living in the same home as the needy child,3 3 the Solman
court cautioned that the HEW had engrafted thereon a regulatory
restriction known as the "essential person" doctrine. 4 Under this
doctrine, the recipient has the sole power to designate as "essential"
a person whose presence in the home is necessary for the child's
well-being. 5 The state welfare agency may consider the needs and
income of an individual so designated only in order to increase the
aid to the AFDC recipient and to insure the essential person's con-
tinued presence in the home.36  By reading the statute to authorize
a reduction of AFDC payments, Connecticut was asserting a flex-
ibility that was nonexistent.
The state was thwarted in its effort to reduce the burden of
AFDC payments to recipients whose husbands were stepfathers of
needy children because it was unable to avoid the "essential person"
rationale. Moreover, Connecticut was unable to prove actual ex-
32 300 F. Supp. at 414.
33 Social Security Act § 240(h), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
3 4 IV HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE ADMIN. § 3131(4), cited in 300 F.
Supp. at 414.
35 An essential person may be, for example, an older brother who can babysit for
the needy child while the mother is employed and provide a sense of well-being over
and above the necessities of sustaining life. See 300 F. Supp. at 414.
36 The HEW " 'essential person rule' permits a state 'to establish the need of the
individual on a basis that recognizes as essential to him the presence in the home of
other needy persons .... ." IV HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE ADMIN. §
3131 (4), quoted in 300 F. Supp. at 414.
In Solman, however, none of the stepfathers had been designated "essential persons."
From a practical standpoint this is understandable because the earning power of the step-
fathers was probably sufficient to preclude the chance that AFDC benefits would have
to be increased in order to enable the stepfather to remain in the home. Put another
way, it would be senseless for a recipient to designate someone an essential person unless
the effect were an increase in the overall family benefits. Of course, the Solman court
ruled that this practical result is required by the essential person doctrine.
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penditures by the stepfather and, thus, it was unable to consider such
outlays available for the support of the children as required in the
absence of a state support statute embracing stepparentsY7  There-
fore, the upshot of Solman is that the income of a stepfather living
in the home cannot be deemed available to the recipient except
under the aegis of a state-imposed support obligation or to the ex-
tent that it is actually expended for the recipient's support.38
Solman purportedly upheld the policy enunciated so forcefully by
the Supreme Court in King that the exclusive requirement for
AFDC eligibility is need.
It is arguable, however, that the Solman court may have extended
the King rationale to a situation that is critically different from the
"substitute father" provision. There is a strong likelihood that the
Connecticut regulatory scheme with respect to stepfathers' income
did not depart from the federal criterion of need, and, what is more,
may have evinced a more direct relationship to a finding of need
than the very federal regulation under which the Solman court
struck down the Connecticut plan. The Connecticut regulation pro-
vided that the state could only deem a stepfather's income available
when: (1) he was employed, and (2) he actually lived in the home.
Careful scrutiny of this twofold standard reveals that it is premised
on a wholly logical assumption, i.e., that a stepfather who is em-
ployed and living in the home is likely to use his income toward
maintaining the family." Connecticut's welfare regulation was un-
questionably a far cry from Alabama's presumptive consideration of
a paramour substitute father's income. Moreover, an administra-
37 300 F. Supp. at 415. In considering this same point, the Supreme Court in King
read a narrow meaning into the availability of the "resources of any child or relative,"
noting that HEW regulations restrict these resources to those actually available to the
recipient and exclude from consideration any income which is merely assumed to be
available. 392 U.S. at 319.
38Relying on the language of the Supreme Court, Judge BlumenfelX noted that
"where the support of a child is at stake, the only relevant circumstance which may re-
lieve the state of its duty to provide AFDC support for a needy child is whether its step-
father did in fact support the child." 300 F. Supp. at 415-16.
39 King clearly held that need is the only classification upon which a state could base
eligibility for AFDC benefits. Therefore, Alabama's classification of a "substitute father"
as a parent, since it had no relevance to the criterion of need, was held to be an arbitrary
classification. In effect, there was no way to determine whether this "substitute father"
would ever financially assist the children of his mistress since his primary interest was
in her rather than in the children. On the other hand, where a stepfather is present in
the home his interest can be expected to encompass more than a relationship with the
woman. Since he is married to the motherthe stepfather is in a position to take some
interest in her children, and "the community has always expected that when a man en-
tered into a marriage contract with a woman who had prior children he was knowingly
and willingly undertaking the burden of supporting the whole family .... " Brief for
Appellant at 9, Shapiro v. Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (1969), a!f'g mem. 300 F. Supp. 409.
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tive presumption based on a stepfather who has a steady job and
who is continually present in the family abode seems more likely
to produce fair results than the present HEW requirement of a
ceremonial marriage and a state support law of general application. °
That is, the mere existence of a legal duty of support seems less
likely to generate available income from the stepfather than the
Connecticut requirement of the stepfather's presence in the home as
a wage earner. Further analysis reveals that the Connecticut regu-
lations provided that a stepfather's income was but one factor to be
considered, and if it were shown that the stepfather did not earn
sufficient income to provide for a decent way of life the state would
contribute the difference or assume the entire burden.4' The better
test to determine the level of state AFDC payments to stepchildren
is not whether the state has a general law obligating all stepfathers
to support their stepchildren, but whether the stepfather is a wage
earner who actually lives in the home.
In jurisdictions where there is no general support statute, Solman
has sharply curtailed state discretion in the administration of their
AFDC programs because the states are unable to alleviate the heavy
40 See 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969).
41 Brief for Appellant at 10, Shapiro v. Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (1969). Connecticut
argued that the state statute "was not passed to punish or discourage anyone. The statute
merely codified what was already an accepted social fact, and actually the State of Con-
necticut went even further by offering to ease any burden if it were too heavy." Id. at 11.
It should be noted that a stepfather's income may be considered in order to reduce
AFDC benefits upon a showing that he held his stepchildren out to the community as
his own. This exception to the general rule is based on the theory that a person standing
in loco parentis to a child is entitled to the rights and also subject to the liabilities of
an actual parent. J. MADDEN, ON PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 367 (1931).
In fact, a Connecticut court has recently upheld the denial of AFDC benefits on the
theory of loco parentis because the stepfather had held the stepchildren out to the world
as his own. The court conceded that Connecticut had no law obligating the stepfather
to support his stepchildren, "but if he has assumed the parental relation, acting in loco
parentis, and holds them out to the world as members of his own family, he may incur
the same liability for support as if they were his own children." Ladd v. Welfare
Comm'r, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 504, 217 A.2d 490 (Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1965).
A more convincing argument was the object of a recent New Jersey decision. Here
the state court affirmed the state welfare agency's curtailment of AFDC funds to a family
with a stepfather. The court held that the income of the stepfather, if living in the
home, is includable for purposes of AFDC even though he is under no obligation by state
law to support the stepchildren. The court distinguished King because: (1) The state
was not trying to indirectly enforce a standard of sexual mores, and (2) the stepfather
had held himself out to the world as the father. Tartaglio v. Division of Pub. Welfare,
102 N.J. Super. 592, 246 A.2d 483 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
It seems to be a distinction without a difference to presume that a stepfather con-
tributes support money to his stepchildren where he meets the technical elements of a
"holding out" test but not where he is earning money and lives at home. In the latter
case, the stepfather has merely failed to vocalize his affection for his stepchildren to a
point where a court is prepared to say that he held them out as his own.
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burden of welfare disbursements unless they can prove that support
payments have actually been made by a stepfather.42  Adherence to
this strict standard can be expected to produce some unsettling ef-
fects. Because in the Solman situation the state must contribute to
the support of stepchildren and because, presumptively, the state
has no legal machinery to require contributions of the stepfather,
this decision creates an inducement for stepfathers to disregard
moral obligations of support. Assume, for example, that S is a
stepfather of four children living in State A which has a statute
obligating stepfathers to support their stepchildren. If S earns $200
per month, the welfare agency in state A is able to deem his entire
salary available for the children's support; and, assuming the cur-
rent need of the family is $600 per month, the net AFDC disburse-
ment is $400. Given the above facts, in state B which, like Con-
necticut, imposes no support obligation on stepfathers the welfare
agency could not offset the total family need by the amount of S's
salary. Thus, the AFDC program would bear the total $600 ex-
penditure; however, S would be able to spend his salary in any man-
ner he desired. In comparison with natural parents who are uni-
versally required to support their own children,43 stepfathers living
in states such as Connecticut derive a double windfall from the
So/nan rule: (1) The stepparent is free of any legal compulsion
to support his stepchildren, and (2) he is free of any moral obliga-
tion because AFDC payments are available to his children regardless
of his personal income. A graver implication, especially trouble-
some considering the limited resources available in many states, is
the fiscal roadblock imposed by the inflexible Solman standard that
may effectively impede allocation of state resources to more criti-
cal areas of need. By its turgid reading of the HEW regulation,
the Solman court has failed to recognize a situation where the state
is competent to regulate and should be given the discretion to do so.
This decision has not given the states many alternatives. The
pro forma enactment of a statewide support obligation seems the
most expedient choice - perhaps, the only choice. Otherwise, in
reasoning that the patently discriminatory regulation struck down
in King was analogous to the Connecticut welfare guidelines -
guidelines which were arguably within the scope of permissible
4 2 The Solman court noted: "There is no doubt that the state may properly take into
account amounts actually expended by the stepparent in support of the stepchildren."
300 F. Supp. at 416.
4 3 H. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS §. 15.1, at 488
(1968).
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